摘要：2025年10月，美英执法当局联合对柬埔寨太子集团及创始人陈志发起行动，没收其通过“路边矿池”清洗的12.7万枚比特币（约150亿美元），创下美国单次资产没收纪录。该案涉及加密货币诈骗、开设赌场、强迫劳动等混合犯罪，核心是美国突破传统管辖边界的执法实践。上海市锦天城曾峥律师团队认为，此案中美国通过扩张解释《连线欺诈法》“数字基础设施连接点”、适用《洗钱法》域外管辖条款，结合区块链穿透式溯源技术与美英联合执法、“全政府”制裁模式，体现其以“数字痕迹”和“金融触点”为核心的长臂管辖新扩张，为全球加密货币持有人敲醒警钟的同时也为跨境犯罪的资产追索和冻结提供了案例参考。

Abstract:In October 2025, U.S. and U.K. law enforcement authorities launched a joint operation against Cambodia's Prince Group and its founder, Chen Zhi, seizing 127,000 Bitcoins (approximately $15 billion) laundered through the "LuBian Mining Pool." This action set a new record for a single asset forfeiture by the United States. The case involves hybrid crimes, including cryptocurrency fraud and forced labor, but its core significance lies in the U.S. enforcement practice of transcending traditional jurisdictional boundaries.According to the team led by Lawyer Zeng Zheng at Shanghai AllBright Law Offices, this case demonstrates how the U.S. has constructed a new paradigm of long-arm jurisdiction centered on "digital footprints" and "financial touchpoints." This was achieved by expansively interpreting "digital infrastructure connection points" under the Wire Fraud Act, applying the extraterritorial jurisdiction clauses of the Money Laundering Control Act, and leveraging blockchain penetration tracing technology alongside U.S.-U.K. joint enforcement and a "whole-of-government" sanction model. While serving as a wake-up call for global cryptocurrency compliance holders, this case also provides a critical judicial reference for global cryptocurrency compliance and the governance of transnational crime. Moreover, it underscores the new transformation of jurisdictional rules in the era of the digital economy.

关键词：跨国加密货币犯罪；美国域外执法；长臂管辖；区块链溯源；资产没收；太子集团案

Keywords: transnational cryptocurrency crime; U.S. extraterritorial enforcement; long-arm jurisdiction; blockchain tracing; asset forfeiture; Prince Group case

2025年10月美国司法部（DOJ）联合财政部及英国执法当局，对柬埔寨太子集团及其创办人陈志（Chen Zhi）提起刑事起诉并实施金融制裁措施，同时针对其关联加密资产发起民事没收诉讼。美国司法部指控太子集团为亚洲最大跨国犯罪组织之一，没收了陈志持有12.7万枚比特币（按当时市值估算约150亿美元），创下该部门史上最大规模单次资产没收记录[1]。本案在跨境执法与加密货币资产合规领域具有重大判例价值，尤其是执法机构成功追溯并冻结了源自2021年黑客攻击、经由“LuBian矿池”（LuBian Mining Pool）清洗的历史资金。这一情况表明，美国已突破传统物理管辖边界，构建起基于“数字基础设施”与“资金流转”的长臂管辖新范式，具备对区块链历史交易进行穿透式分析及在全球范围内实施资产控制的技术优势。本文将从管辖权构建的法理逻辑、数字资产控制的技术维度及多边执法协作机制三个方面，对该案展开详尽的法律剖析。

In October 2025, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), together with the Treasury Department and U.K. law enforcement authorities, initiated criminal proceedings and imposed financial sanctions against Cambodia’s Prince Group and its founder, Chen Zhi. At the same time, they launched civil asset forfeiture proceedings against associated cryptocurrency assets. The DOJ accused Prince Group of being one of Asia’s largest transnational criminal organizations and seized 127,000 bitcoins held by Chen Zhi (valued at approximately $15 billion at the time), marking the largest single asset forfeiture in the department’s history. This case holds significant precedential value in the fields of international criminal law and digital asset compliance, particularly as law enforcement succeeded in tracing and freezing historical funds originating from the 2021 hacking attacks, which were laundered via the “LuBian Mining Pool.” This demonstrates that the U.S. has overcome traditional physical jurisdictional limitations, establishing a new paradigm of long-arm jurisdiction based on “digital infrastructure” and “financial flows,” with the technical capability to conduct in-depth analysis of blockchain transaction histories and enforce asset controls globally. This article will provide a detailed legal analysis of the case from three perspectives: the jurisprudential logic of jurisdictional construction, the technical dimensions of digital asset control, and multilateral law enforcement cooperation mechanisms.

2025年10月14日，美国司法部纽约东区检察官办公室（EDNY）正式披露针对Prince Group创始人陈志及其同伙的起诉书[2]。此次行动不仅仅是孤立的刑事追责，而是美国政府“全政府”策略的一次集中实践，涉及刑事诉讼、民事资产没收及行政制裁三个维度。

On October 14, 2025, the Office of the U.S. Attorney for the Eastern District of New York (EDNY) officially unsealed the indictment against Prince Group founder Chen Zhi and his associates. This operation was not only an isolated criminal sanction, but rather a concentrated application of the U.S. government’s “whole-of-government” strategy, involving coordinated efforts across three dimensions: criminal prosecution, civil asset forfeiture, and administrative sanctions.

依据起诉书及美国财政部外国资产控制办公室（OFAC）的认定，Prince Group被界定为组织严密、分工明确的跨国犯罪组织（Transnational Criminal Organization, TCO）。该集团一方面在柬埔寨运营多处封闭式园区，通过强迫劳动实施大规模“杀猪盘”投资骗局；另一方面通过空壳公司、赌场和跨境金融通道对诈骗所得进行洗钱[3]。这一TCO定性与2025年2月Bondi备忘录及6月Blanche FCPA变革趋势形成了清晰呼应，后者明确要求优先处理与卡特尔和跨国犯罪组织相关的海外腐败与洗钱案件，典型重点包括：

第一，与TCO犯罪活动明确相关的行为；

第二，利用为TCO洗钱的实体或空壳公司；

第三，涉及收受TCO贿赂的外国国有实体雇员。

太子集团案被OFAC定性为TCO的实体，这一策略呼应了DOJ执行新指南的变更。它标志着美国域外执法已从单纯的反贿赂合规，向维护国家安全和打击“有组织犯罪”的战略维度延伸。

Based on the indictment and OFAC’s designation, Prince Group is characterized as a highly organized and functionally specialized transnational criminal organization (TCO). On the one hand, it operates closed “scam compounds” in Cambodia where trafficked workers are forced to perpetrate large-scale “pig-butchering” investment schemes. On the other hand, it launders the resulting proceeds through shell companies, casinos, and cross-border financial channels. This TCO characterization is closely aligned with the DOJ’s revised FCPA enforcement priorities reflected in the February 2025 Bondi Memorandum and the June 2025 Blanche Guidelines, which direct prosecutors to prioritize cases related to cartels and TCOs, including the following:

First, conduct that is clearly related to TCO criminal activities;

Second, the use of entities or shell companies to launder money for TCOs;

Third, actions involving the receipt of bribes from TCOs by foreign state-owned enterprise employees.

In the Prince Group case, OFAC’s use of its TCO authorities, combined with these updated FCPA enforcement guidelines, signals a shift in U.S. extraterritorial enforcement from a narrow focus on traditional anti-bribery compliance toward a broader strategy centred on national security and the dismantling of organized criminal enterprises.

在处理非美国实体（Prince Group 为柬埔寨企业）及非美国公民（陈志为柬埔寨籍）在境外实施的犯罪行为时，美国联邦法院面临的首要问题是如何确立合法的管辖权。

When addressing criminal acts committed abroad by non-U.S. entities (such as Prince Group, a Cambodian enterprise) and non-U.S. citizens (such as Chen Zhi, a Cambodian national), the primary legal challenge faced by U.S. federal courts is how to establish legitimate jurisdiction.

2.1《连线欺诈法》中“基础设施连接点”的法理解释

The Jurisprudential Interpretation of "Infrastructure Connection Points" in the Wire Fraud Act

陈志被控违反《美国法典》第18卷第1349条，即连线欺诈共谋条款。依据《连线欺诈法》（WireFraudAct,18U.S.C.§1343），确立联邦管辖权的核心要素并非被告人的实际地理位置，而是其行为是否借助跨州或外国的电线、无线电或电视通讯设施来实施欺诈计划。

在本案中，美国检方对“使用美国设施”这一连接点进行了详尽的法理拓展。尽管诈骗行为的实际实施地点在柬埔寨，受害者遍布全球，但检方强调，犯罪网络在实施诈骗（如发送诱导信息、运营虚假投资平台）时，使用了美国的互联网基础设施。根据美国司法判例（如 United States v. Kim）[4]，只要电子信号（Data Packets）在传输过程中若经过位于美国境内的服务器或交换节点，便能够满足管辖权要求。鉴于全球主流社交媒体（例如WhatsApp、Facebook、Telegram等）以及云服务提供商的服务器架构大多涉及美国节点，这一解释实际上赋予了美国对全球绝大多数网络诈骗案件的潜在管辖权。

Chen Zhi is charged with conspiracy to commit wire fraud under Title 18, Section 1349 of the United States Code. According to the Wire Fraud Act (18 U.S.C. §1343), the core factor in establishing federal jurisdiction is not the defendant’s actual geographic location, but whether their conduct utilizes interstate or international wire, radio, or television communication facilities to carry out the fraudulent scheme.

In this case, U.S. prosecutors have provided a detailed legal expansion of the "use of U.S. facilities" as a connection point. Although the fraudulent acts were carried out in Cambodia and victims were spread across the globe, the prosecution emphasized that the criminal network used U.S. internet infrastructure while executing the fraud (such as sending inducement messages and operating fake investment platforms). According to U.S. judicial precedents (such as United States v. Kim), if electronic signals (data packets) pass through servers or exchange nodes located within the United States during transmission, jurisdictional requirements can be met. Given that the server architecture of most major global social media platforms (such as WhatsApp, Facebook, Telegram) and cloud service providers typically involves U.S. nodes, this interpretation effectively grants the U.S. potential jurisdiction over the vast majority of global online fraud cases.

此外，起诉书明确表明，该犯罪网络针对并窃取了美国境内受害者的资产。尽管传统的属地原则要求行为发生在本国境内，但“客观领土原则”（Objective Territorial Principle）允许国家对在境外发起但在本国产生有害结果的行为行使管辖权。

Furthermore, the indictment explicitly states that the criminal network targeted and misappropriated assets belonging to victims located within the United States. Although the traditional principle of territoriality requires that the conduct occur within the nation's borders, the Objective Territorial Principle permits a country to exercise jurisdiction over acts initiated abroad that produce harmful effects within its territory.

2.2《洗钱法》对“特定非法活动”的域外追诉逻辑

The Extraterritorial Prosecution Logic of the "Specified Unlawful Activity" under the Money Laundering Statute

针对陈志的另一项核心指控是洗钱共谋（18U.S.C.§1956(h)）。该法案第（f）款明确规定了域外管辖权，不过需满足两个特定条件：

第一，交易价值超过10,000美元；

第二，行为涉及发生在美国境内的特定非法活动（Specified Unlawful Activity,简称SUA），或者行为人利用了美国的金融机构。

Another core charge against Chen Zhi is conspiracy to commit money laundering (18 U.S.C. §1956(h)). Subsection (f) of this statute explicitly provides for extraterritorial jurisdiction, but two specific conditions must be satisfied:

First, the transaction value must exceed $10,000;

Second, the conduct must involve a Specified Unlawful Activity (SUA) that occurs within the United States, or the individual must have utilized a U.S. financial institution in the transaction.

美国司法部（DOJ）在本案中的策略也很有代表性。尽管Prince Group的底层犯罪涉及严重的强迫劳动和人口贩运，但直接起诉这些境外犯罪可能会面临复杂的管辖权争议。美国司法部选择将“连线欺诈”作为上游犯罪。由于连线欺诈已被认定为SUA，并且欺诈资金的流转涉及美国受害者或相关设施，因此，任何针对这些欺诈所得的后续处置（洗钱）行为，均自动纳入美国的管辖范围。检方特别指出，该集团的洗钱活动曾通过位于纽约东区的相关活动开展。在加密货币的情境下，这通常意味着涉案资金的流转涉及稳定币（如USDT、USDC）的发行方结算系统，或者经过了位于纽约的加密货币交易所/托管机构的代理账户。根据United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia等判例[5]，只要资金流转链条中的任何一个环节触及美国金融体系（代理银行关系），美国便有权行使管辖权。

通过这种“连线欺诈+洗钱”的法律组合手段，美国成功将一个物理上完全处于境外的犯罪组织，在法律逻辑层面，完整地将相关事项“纳入”了联邦法院的管辖范围。这意味着，在数字经济时代，管辖权的连接点已从“物理存在”全面转向了“数字痕迹”与“金融触点”。

The strategy employed by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in this case is highly representative. Although the underlying offenses committed by the Prince Group involve grave crimes such as forced labor and human trafficking, directly prosecuting these extraterritorial human rights violations could encounter complex jurisdictional challenges. The DOJ opted to treat “wire fraud” as the predicate offense. Because wire fraud has been designated as a Specified Unlawful Activity (SUA), and because the movement of fraud proceeds involved U.S. victims or related facilities, any subsequent disposition of these proceeds (i.e., money laundering) automatically falls within the jurisdiction of the United States. Prosecutors specifically noted that the group’s money laundering operations were conducted through activities in the Eastern District of New York. In the context of cryptocurrency, this typically means that the movement of illicit funds involved the settlement systems of stablecoin issuers (such as USDT or USDC) or passed through proxy accounts at New York-based cryptocurrency exchanges or custodians. According to case law such as United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, as long as any link in the chain of fund transfers touches the U.S. financial system (including correspondent banking relationships), the United States is entitled to assert jurisdiction.

Through this legal combination of “wire fraud plus money laundering,” the U.S. has successfully brought an entirely foreign criminal organization within the complete legal reach of federal courts. This demonstrates that, in the digital economy era, the nexus for jurisdiction has fully shifted from “physical presence” to “digital footprints” and “financial touchpoints.”

根据起诉书宣称，美国执法机构成功识别并没收了“包括但不限于先前存放在以下虚拟货币地址的大约127,271比特币”，也即2020年针对中国LuBian矿池的一起重大黑客攻击所得、且曾长期留存于陈志控制钱包中的加密货币资产。如果该情况属实，这一执法细节从法律与技术两个层面说明了一些问题：一方面，它表明，即便黑客资金在链上沉淀多年，并通过矿池架构进行多层混合和拆分，仍然可能被后续的链上溯源技术重新识别并与原始犯罪建立联系；另一方面，它将LuBian矿池从一个表面上的“算力服务提供商”，重新界定为具有资金清洗功能的关键节点，为后续确立对物管辖权（in rem jurisdiction）奠定了事实基础。

The critical breakthrough in establishing the facts of this case lies in the successful identification and restraint by U.S. authorities of cryptocurrency assets derived from a major 2020 hack on China’s LuBian Mining Pool that had long remained in wallets controlled by Chen Zhi. This enforcement detail reflects both legal and technical perspectives. On the one hand, it shows that even hack proceeds that have lain dormant on-chain for years and been subjected to multiple layers of mixing and splitting through mining-pool structures can still be re-identified and linked back to the original crime by subsequent blockchain forensics. On the other hand, it recasts the LuBian Mining Pool from a seemingly neutral “hashrate service provider” into a critical node with a money-laundering function, thereby laying the factual groundwork for asserting in rem jurisdiction over the assets.

3.1历史交易的去匿名化与链上审查

De-Anonymization of Historical Transactions and On-Chain Auditing

区块链行业内一般认为，一些“违法犯罪”资金在经过较长时间（数年）的闲置，并通过矿池（Mining Pool）算力接入、算力租赁、合并挖矿收益等方式进行多轮混合后，再以矿池出块奖励或收益分配的形式拆分发放，就可以切断与原始违法犯罪行为的关联。矿池的运行机制是将众多矿工的算力进行整合，挖矿收益通常以新币（Coinbase transaction）的形式发放，这在传统链上分析中被视作一种有效的混币方式。因此许多早期涉案资产在策略设计上也有意识地利用矿池架构，期待借助长时间静置和复杂的UTXO拆分来“稀释”风险。

It is generally believed in the blockchain industry that some” illegal and criminal” funds, after remaining dormant for several years and being mixed in multiple rounds via mining pools through methods such as computing power access, computing power leasing, and combined mining income, and then distributed in the form of mining pool block rewards or income distribution.= can sever their connection to the original criminal conduct. The operational mechanism of mining pools involves aggregating the computing power of numerous miners, with mining proceeds typically distributed as new coins through Coinbase transactions. In traditional on-chain analysis, this is regarded as an effective method of coin mixing. Therefore, many assets involved in the early stage also consciously used the mining pool structure in strategic design, expecting to "dilute" risks with the help of long-term static and complex UTXO splits.

然而，起诉书披露的证据显示，Chainalysis等区块链分析机构协助执法部门实现了对复杂洗钱链路的穿透。检方成功追溯了2020年从比特币矿业公司窃取的资金流向。这表明区块链账本的“不可篡改性”为执法机构提供了永久性的追溯线索。即便资金经过多年沉淀或多次流转，只要链上数据存在，执法机构便可运用启发式聚类算法（Heuristic Clustering）和共同支出分析（Common Input Ownership），查明资金的最终去向。在该案中，陈志利用LuBian矿池作为接收和清洗被盗资金的“汇聚点”。如果该情况属实，这意味着美国执法机关可能掌握了某些技术优势，其不仅能够追踪资金进入矿池的情况，还能剖析矿池内部的资金分配逻辑，或者通过识别矿池控制人的钱包特征，证明该矿池并非单纯的算力服务提供商，而是被用于清洗赃款的金融工具。这种“去匿名化”能力意味着，利用矿池架构进行洗钱在技术层面已不再安全。

However, evidence released by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) in this case demonstrates that blockchain analytics firms such as Chainalysis assisted law enforcement in penetrating complex money laundering chains. Prosecutors successfully traced the flow of funds stolen from a bitcoin mining company in 2020. This indicates that the immutability of blockchain ledgers provides law enforcement agencies with permanent investigative leads. Even if funds have been dormant for years or have undergone multiple transfers, as long as on-chain data exists, agencies can employ heuristic clustering algorithms and common input ownership analysis to determine the final destination of the funds.

In this case, Chen Zhi used the LuBian Mining Pool as a hub for receiving and laundering stolen assets. If this is the case,  it means The technical advantage of U.S. law enforcement lies not only in their ability to track the entry of funds into the mining pool, but also in their capacity to analyze the internal fund allocation logic of the pool, or to identify wallet characteristics of the pool’s controller, thereby proving that the mining pool was not merely a computing service provider but was utilized as a financial instrument for laundering illicit proceeds. This “de-anonymization” capability means that, from a technical standpoint, using mining pool structures for money laundering is no longer secure.

3.2黑客攻击背后的“罗生门”

The "Rashomon" of the Cyberattack

引人遐思的是，中国国家计算机病毒应急处理中心在11月9日发布了一份LuBian矿池遭黑客攻击被窃取巨额比特币事件技术溯源分析报告[6]，报告直指2020年攻击路边矿池的黑客攻击或本就为美国政府发起的行动。该报告通过对网络攻击流量特征、所使用的漏洞利用工具以及服务器跳板的深度复盘，指出攻击源头与美国特定机构关联紧密。这一发现让案件的性质变得扑朔迷离：美国司法部宣称的追缴被盗资产，在这另一重技术叙事中，似乎变成了某种形式的跨境“钓鱼执法”。

Intriguingly, on November 9, China's National Computer Virus Emergency Response Center (CVERC) released a technical attribution report regarding the theft of massive amounts of Bitcoin from the "LuBian Mining Pool." The report explicitly alleges that the 2020 hacker attack on the pool may have actually been initiated by the U.S. government. Through an in-depth reconstruction of network attack traffic characteristics, the exploit tools used, and server jump points, the report indicates that the source of the attack is closely linked to specific U.S. agencies. This finding renders the nature of the case shrouded in mystery: what the U.S. Department of Justice claims to be the "recovery of stolen assets" appears, in this alternative technical narrative, to be a form of "entrapment" or a cross boarder state-orchestrated operation.

目前，关于这一巨额资产转移背后的真相，呈现出截然不同的两种版本。一方将其定性为跨境打击网络犯罪与洗钱的胜利，另一方则通过技术溯源质疑了整个事件的源头正当性。然而，撇开事实层面的重重迷雾，无论如何——不管是通过追踪后的司法程序的事后没收，还是发动国家力量“黑客”干预，本案都从侧面展示出对看上去似乎去中心化的加密货币生态系统，美国执法机关已经具备极强的穿刺力与掌控力。在国家级力量的技术渗透与法律管辖的双重攻势下，加密货币世界引以为傲的匿名性与去中心化屏障，正面临前所未有的解构与挑战。

Currently, two starkly different versions of the truth exist regarding the transfer of these massive assets. One side characterizes it as a victory in the fight against cross-border cybercrime and money laundering, while the other questions the legitimacy of the entire event's origin through technical attribution. However, setting aside the factual fog, this incident indisputably reveals a core reality: whether through post-hoc forfeiture via judicial processes or the active intervention of the state power "hackers", the U.S. government has demonstrated immense penetration capability andcontrol over the decentralized cryptocurrency ecosystem. Under the dual offensive of state-level technical infiltration and legal jurisdiction, the anonymity and decentralization barriers that the cryptocurrency world prides itself on are facing unprecedented deconstruction and challenges.

3.3对私钥的实际掌控与“对物管辖权”的确定

Actual Control Over Private Keys and Determination of In Rem Jurisdiction

此次行动依据《民事没收法》（18U.S.C.§981(a)(1)(C)）对约127,271枚比特币启动了没收程序。在法律程序上，这属于对物诉讼，其主要特点是诉讼对象为资产本身而非犯罪嫌疑人。

This operation initiated forfeiture proceedings for approximately 127,271 bitcoins pursuant to the Civil Forfeiture Statute (18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C)). Legally, this constitutes an in rem action, characterized by the fact that the subject of litigation is the asset itself rather than the alleged offender.

在数字资产的跨境执法中，确定对物管辖权在法理层面的难点在于精准界定被执行的财产所在地，特别是在涉及不动产、股权、知识产权等不同类型资产的情形下。鉴于加密货币存储于去中心化网络，其物理位置难以明确界定。美国执法机关在本案中所采取的策略为：借助技术手段获取并掌控了存储这些资产的非托管钱包的私钥，并将资产转移至美国政府控制的托管账户之中。

In cross-border enforcement of digital assets, the core jurisprudential challenge in determining in rem jurisdiction lies in precisely identifying the location of the property to be executed, especially for various asset types such as real estate, equity interests, and intellectual property. Given that cryptocurrencies are stored on decentralized networks, their physical location cannot be clearly defined. In this case, the United States Law enforcement agencies employed technical means to obtain and control the private keys of non-custodial wallets holding these assets, subsequently transferring the assets to government-controlled custodial accounts.

从法理角度分析，这一行为构建了如下管辖逻辑：

第一，控制即占有：在数字资产的语境下，掌握私钥等同于对资产实施排他性控制。

第二，占有即管辖：一旦美国政府实现对私钥的控制，该数字资产的法律所在地便被视为转移至美国境内。

第三，管辖权的排他性：这种基于“实际控制”所确立的管辖权，使美国法院能够对这批价值150亿美元的比特币行使裁决权，而无需考虑陈志本人的国籍或其物理所在地。

这一实践极大地拓展了美国法院的管辖范围，确立了数字领土原则，即美国执法力量能够触及的数字空间，均可视为其司法管辖的延伸。

From a legal perspective, this approach establishes the following jurisdictional logic:

First, control equals possession: In the context of digital assets, holding the private key is tantamount to exercising exclusive control over the asset.

Second, possession equals jurisdiction: Once the U.S. government gains control of the private key, the legal situs of the digital asset is considered to have shifted to the United States.

Third, exclusivity of jurisdiction: This jurisdiction, established on the basis of “actual control,” enables U.S. courts to exercise adjudicative authority over the $15 billion worth of bitcoins, irrespective of Chen Zhi’s nationality or physical location.

This practice greatly expands the jurisdictional reach of U.S. courts, establishing the principle of digital territoriality: any digital space accessible by U.S. law enforcement is regarded as an extension of its judicial jurisdiction.

Prince Group案的另一显著特点是美国司法部、财政部与英国执法当局的深度协作。这种跨国联合执法并非单纯的外交姿态，而是针对跨国犯罪组织（TCO）构建的法律封锁网络。

Another notable feature of the Prince Group case is the deep cooperation between the U.S. Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, and U.K. law enforcement authorities. Such cross-border joint enforcement is not merely diplomatic posturing, but rather the construction of a legal blockade network targeting transnational criminal organizations (TCOs).

跨国犯罪组织通常利用不同司法管辖区之间的法律空白、引渡条约缺失或执法协调的时间差进行管辖权套利（Jurisdictional Arbitrage）。在本案中，美英两国于同一时间点（2025年10月14日）宣布行动，体现两国的战术协同。一方面，这种同步性旨在防止嫌疑人在一方采取行动后，利用时间差将资产转移至另一方管辖区或第三国。另一方面，英国作为全球金融中心，其法律体系（特别是关于民事追偿和资产冻结的令状）与美国的刑事没收形成互补。若涉案资金流经伦敦的金融体系或涉及英属海外领地的离岸架构，英国执法机构的介入将填补美国管辖权的潜在空白区域。

Transnational criminal organizations often exploit legal gaps between different jurisdictions, the absence of extradition treaties, or time lags in law enforcement coordination to engage in jurisdictional arbitrage. In this case, the United States and the United Kingdom announced their operations simultaneously on October 14, 2025, demonstrating a high degree of tactical coordination between the two countries. On one hand, such synchronization aims to prevent suspects from transferring assets to another jurisdiction or a third country by taking advantage of time differences after one party initiates action. On the other hand, as a global financial center, the United Kingdom’s legal system—especially with respect to civil recovery and asset freezing orders—complements the United States’ criminal forfeiture mechanisms. If the involved funds flow through London’s financial system or involve offshore structures in British Overseas Territories, the intervention of UK law enforcement agencies will fill any potential jurisdictional gaps left by the United States.

除刑事诉讼和资产没收外，本案还借助美国财政部的行政制裁，实施了全政府打击策略。

In addition to criminal litigation and asset forfeiture, this case also leveraged administrative sanctions imposed by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, implementing a whole-of-government strategy to combat crime.

5.1OFAC的TCO认定与金融阻断

OFAC’s TCO Designation and Financial Blocking Measures

美国财政部外国资产控制办公室（OFAC）正式将Prince Group指定为跨国犯罪组织（TCO），并对陈志及146个相关目标实施了制裁[7]。这一行政措施的法律效力体现在：

第一，切断美元通道。依据制裁规则，任何美国人（US Persons）及涉及美国金融系统的外国机构，均被禁止与被制裁对象进行任何交易。鉴于美元在全球结算中的主导地位，这意味着Prince Group实际上被排除在全球主流金融体系之外。

第二，施加次级制裁风险。非美国金融机构若继续为被制裁对象提供服务，亦面临被美国制裁的风险（次级制裁），这迫使全球合规银行主动终止与Prince Group的业务往来。

The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has officially designated Prince Group as a Transnational Criminal Organization (TCO) and imposed sanctions on Chen Zhi and 146 related targets. The legal effect of this administrative action is as follows:

First, severing access to U.S. dollar channels. Under the sanctions regime, any U.S. Person or foreign institution involved in the U.S. financial system is prohibited from engaging in any transactions with sanctioned parties. Given the dominant role of the U.S. dollar in global settlements, this effectively excludes Prince Group from the mainstream international financial system.

Second, imposing secondary sanctions risk. Non-U.S. financial institutions that continue to provide services to sanctioned entities also risk being sanctioned by the United States (secondary sanctions), which compels global compliance banks to proactively terminate business relationships with Prince Group.

5.2FinCEN的特别措施与反洗钱隔离

FinCEN’s Special Measures and Anti-Money Laundering Isolation

美国财政部金融犯罪执法局（FinCEN）依据《爱国者法案》（USA PATRIOT Act）相关条款，采取了针对性的金融隔离措施，切断了洗钱中介Huione Group与美国金融系统的联系。这种行政认定的门槛低于刑事定罪，但其打击效果具有即时性和毁灭性，能够迅速冻结犯罪组织的资金流动性，使其在刑事审判尚未终结前便丧失运营能力。

Pursuant to relevant provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) implemented targeted financial isolation measures, severing the connection between money laundering intermediary Huione Group and the U.S. financial system. The threshold for such administrative determinations is lower than that for criminal conviction, yet the enforcement effect is immediate and devastating, swiftly freezing the liquidity of criminal organizations and rendering them inoperable even before the conclusion of criminal proceedings.

本案是美国在跨国加密货币犯罪领域的一次标志性域外执法行动。联系美国之前FCPA的暂停，说明美国的大型跨境执法早已不需单纯依赖FCPA，而是通过连线欺诈、洗钱、民事没收、TCO制裁及第311条特别措施的组合运用，将境外实施的犯罪包括利用加密货币实施的混合型犯罪行为（网络诈骗、洗钱等）纳入统一的执法框架。

通过对《连线欺诈法》和《洗钱法》管辖连接点的扩张性解释，并结合国家力量对区块链历史数据的穿透式掌控以及金融情报的跨境共享，美国执法机关构建了一套有别于传统“属地+国籍”模式的长臂管辖打法：凡业务运行中涉及美元结算、美国金融机构、美国网络基础设施或美国受害者，即便相关主体从未在美国设立实体或开展传统意义上的“业务存在”，达到一定程度即有可能被纳入美国法律的适用范围并面临资产被没收的风险。这一事件标志着加密货币领域不再是法外之地，同时也早已成为大国博弈的新战场。加密货币的“匿名”和“去中心化”似乎难以对抗这种国家级的执法能力，传统的法律规避框架，也很难面对这种穿透式的复合执法重击。美国展示了其对链上资产强大的穿透和长臂管辖能力（即使资产在冷钱包中，只要掌握了关键线索或私钥即可控制），而该事件也有可能引发全球加密货币持有人对于“数字资产主权”和“谁能控制比特币”的恐慌。

This case  represent a pivotal moment in the evolution of U.S. extraterritorial enforcement against transnational cryptocurrency crime. Rather than relying solely on the FCPA to police overseas commercial bribery, U.S. authorities deployed a coordinated toolkit of wire-fraud and money-laundering charges, civil forfeiture, TCO sanctions, and Section 311 special measures to address a hybrid threat crimes that combines cyber-enabled fraud, money-laundering.

By expansively interpreting jurisdictional nexuses under the Wire Fraud Statute and the Money Laundering Statute, Using State power ,leveraging historical blockchain analytics, and integrating cross-border financial intelligence, the United States has constructed a long-arm enforcement approach  that departs from traditional “territory plus nationality” concepts. Any business activity that touches U.S. dollar clearing, U.S. financial institutions, U.S. network infrastructure, or U.S. victims may fall within the reach of U.S. law and be exposed to asset-forfeiture risk (to some extent) , even where the relevant entities have no physical presence in the United States. This case underscores that the cryptocurrency field is no longer beyond the reach of the law and has long become a new battlefield for major power games. The pseudo-anonymity and decentralization of cryptoassets no longer provide meaningful protection against state-level enforcement, and that traditional compliance programs are ill-equipped to manage the converging risks of penetrating and compound law enforcement

The United States has demonstrated its powerful penetration and long-arm jurisdiction over on-chain assets (even if the assets are in cold wallets, as long as key clues or private keys are in hand, control can be achieved), and this incident may also trigger panic among global cryptocurrency holders over "digital asset sovereignty" and "who can control Bitcoin"