“Long-Arm Jurisdiction” generally refers to a nation, for the purpose of safeguarding national security, economic interests, or public order, among others, extending the scope of its domestic laws to foreign entities through its domestic legislation. The United States is deemed the country that currently employs long-arm jurisdiction framework most extensively in the world, especially in fields such as export control, economic sanctions, anti-corruption, and other related fields. The U.S. has established a comprehensive extraterritorial legal regime through domestic statutes and regulations such as the Export Administration Regulations (EAR), the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), and the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA).

China has been one of the primary countries affected by the United States’ long-arm jurisdiction framework in areas such as export control and economic sanctions. Over the years, the U.S. has broadened the concept of national security and abused export control measures, adopting discriminatory practices against China and unilaterally exercising long-arm jurisdiction rules over a wide range of products, including semiconductor equipment and chips. In the so-called “Trump 2.0 era”, particularly since the China–U.S. economic and trade talks held in Madrid in September 2025, the U.S. has, within a mere twenty days, introduced a series of additional restrictive measures against China. These measures include: adding numerous Chinese entities to the Export Control Entity List and the Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN List); arbitrarily expanding the scope of controlled enterprises through the so-called “penetrating rule” (50% Rule), affecting thousands of Chinese companies; and ignoring China’s concerns and goodwill, insisting on implementing Section 301 measures against China’s maritime, logistics, and shipbuilding industries. These US actions have severely undermined China’s interests and gravely damaged the atmosphere of the bilateral economic and trade talks. Facing these circumstances, China has no choice but to take countermeasures in response.

Against this backdrop, on October 9, 2025, China’s Ministry of Commerce issued seven announcements (such as Nos. 55, 56, 57, 58, 61, and 62), imposing export controls on items relating to superhard materials, certain rare earth equipment and raw or auxiliary materials, certain medium and heavy rare earths, lithium batteries, and artificial graphite anode materials, as well as on certain overseas rare earth items and on technologies related to rare earths. These additional export control measures constitute a legitimate step by the Chinese government to strengthen its export control system in accordance with laws and regulations; they also represent proactive measures by China, as a responsible major country, to fulfil its international obligations, including non-proliferation, and better safeguard global peace and regional stability. At the same time, they also serve as a reciprocal response to the United States’ long-standing unilateral abuse of the long-arm jurisdiction in export controls, which has severely restricted the legitimate development rights and interests of Chinese companies.

Among the newly added export control measures, one of the most significant is China’s First-Ever Implementation Rules on Rare Earth Items under the “Long-Arm Jurisdiction” Framework. China’s Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 61 of 2025 (“Decision on the Publication of the Implementation of Export Controls on Certain Overseas Rare Earth Items”) explicitly states that overseas organizations and individuals will be directly subject to China’s export control rules on rare earths. With this move, China’s export control rules on rare earths, one of China’s key strategic advantages in the China-US trade war, have begun to narrow the gap with the US’s long-arm jurisdiction framework. This represents a significant step in the ongoing improvement of China’s legal framework for export control and economic sanctions. It is also a necessary measure taken by the Chinese government to safeguard its legitimate rights and interests amid the escalating China–U.S. trade war, while adhering to its consistent stance that China “is not willing to fight but never afraid of it”.

(1) Article 44 of the China’s Export Control Law

On December 1, 2020, China’s Export Control Law officially came into effect. This law is China’s first fundamental law on export control content. It integrates the original decentralised control rules for dual-use items such as nuclear, biological, chemical, and missile items, establishes a unified legal framework, and promotes the legalisation, standardisation, and systematisation of China’s export control work. Article 44 of the law stipulates: “Where any organization or individual outside the territory of the People's Republic of China, in violation of the provisions of the present Law on the administration of export control, endangers the national security and interests of the People's Republic of China, or hinders the fulfillment of such international obligations as non-proliferation, it/he shall be dealt with in accordance with the law and investigated for legal liability.” This provision for the first time established the basic principle that China’s export control legal system has extraterritorial effect, and pointed out that China’s export control rules can be directly applied to organizations and individuals outside the country. At the same time, Article 48 of the law established the principle of reciprocity in international relations regarding export control rules. The specific provision is: “Where any country or region harms the national security and interests of the People's Republic of China by abusing the export control measures, the People's Republic of China may take reciprocal measures against such country or region in light of the actual situations.”

(2) Article 49 of the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items

December 1, 2024, four years after the implementation of the Export Control Law, China’s Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items came into effect. The Regulations are an important legal document for China to improve its export control system, enhance the level of legal basis for dual-use export control, fulfil international treaty obligations, and promote international cooperation on non-proliferation. Article 49 of the Regulations stipulates: “The competent department of commerce of the State Council may require the business operators involved to refer to the relevant provisions of the present Regulations for the transfer or provision of the following goods, technologies and services outside the People’s Republic of China by overseas organizations or individuals to specific destination countries and regions or to specific organizations and individuals: (1) dual-use items manufactured outside the People's Republic of China that contain, integrate or mix specific dual-use items originating in the People's Republic of China; (2) dual-use items manufactured outside the territory of China by using specific technologies and other such dual-use items originating in the People's Republic of China; and (3) specific dual-use items originating in the People's Republic of China.” Article 49 for the first time established the basic rules for the extraterritorial application of China’s export control rules on dual-use items, and clearly stated that overseas entities (organizations and individuals) that transfer or provide specific dual-use items originating in China abroad, as well as dual-use items manufactured abroad but that use other specific dual-use items (including specific technologies) originating in China, shall fall under the jurisdiction of China’s export control laws and regulations.

(3) Legislative Preconditions Fully Established

It can therefore be concluded that, before the issuance of Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 61 of 2025 on October 9, the basic principle of extraterritorial application of China’s export control legal system had already been established, and the basic rules of extraterritorial application of export control rules on dual-use items had already been formulated. These National People’s Congress laws and State Council administrative regulations on export control have laid a solid legislative foundation and provided sufficient legal sources for the formulation and promulgation of specific rules on the extraterritorial application of export control on specialized items in China.

Article 1 of the Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 61 of 2025 clearly states that overseas entities (overseas organizations and individuals, also referred to in the Announcement as “overseas specific export operators”) exporting certain rare earth items that fall into the three specific categories must first obtain a dual-use item export license issued by the Ministry of Commerce of China.

(1) The legislative model adopts the three categories definition in Article 49 of the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items

Article 1 states that before exporting any of the following three types of rare earth items to countries and regions other than China, overseas specific export operators shall obtain a dual-use items export license issued by the Ministry of Commerce of China:

1. If the relevant rare earth materials (including rare earth permanent magnet materials and/or rare earth target materials) manufactured overseas contain, incorporate or are mixed with relevant rare earth substance (or substances) originating in China (metals, alloys or oxides, namely samarium metal, samarium-cobalt alloy, dysprosium oxide, etc., a total of thirteen rare earth substances), and this substance (or these substances) accounts for 0.1% or more of the value of the aforementioned rare earth materials, then the export operators of such rare earth materials must first apply for a license from the Ministry of Commerce of China.

2. If the relevant rare earth items (including rare earth materials and/or rare earth substances) manufactured or produced overseas use relevant rare earth technologies of  Chinese origin (including rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, or rare earth secondary resource recycling and utilization related technologies), the export operators of such rare earth items must first apply for a license from the Ministry of Commerce of China.

3. For rare earth items that are of Chinese origin (including rare earth materials and/or rare earth substances), the export operators of such rare earth items must first apply for a license from the Ministry of Commerce of China.

Therefore, it is evident that content of “Article 1” of Announcement No. 61 adopts the legislative approach of Article 49 of the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, namely “ dual-use items manufactured overseas that contain, integrate or mix with specific dual-use items originating in China; dual-use items manufactured overseas by using specific technologies and other such dual-use items originating in China; and specific dual-use items originating in China”. Thus, reflecting the clear legislative basis and origin of China’s extraterritorial application rules of rare earth export control.

(2) Definition of the “Country of Origin” for Rare Earths

Through the analysis of the above legal provisions, we can see that China’s standard for determining the country of origin of rare earth items is the place of manufacture (production). Therefore, the country of origin of all rare earth items (materials and substances) manufactured (produced) in China is China.

According to this origin determination standard, rare earth items (materials and substances) manufactured (produced) overseas are not considered to be of Chinese origin. However, according to Article 1 of the Announcement 2025 No. 61, even if a rare earth item is not of Chinese origin, such as rare earth materials manufactured in the United States, if it meets the requirements of Clause 1 (rare earth materials incorporating rare earth substances of Chinese origin and meeting a certain value proportion) and Clause 2 (rare earth substances or materials produced by using rare earth technology originating in China) of Article 1 of Announcement No. 61, it is still directly subject to China’s export control laws and regulations.

(3) Regarding the “Chinese Content Rule” and the “0.1% and Above” Value Proportion

Compared with Clause 1 of Article 49 of the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items, Clause 1 of Article 1 of Announcement No. 61 adds the proportion of the value of rare earth substances originating in China to the value of rare earth materials manufactured overseas, namely 0.1% and above.

 Put differently, not all exports of rare earth materials manufactured overseas incorporating rare earth substances originating in China require prior application for a license from the Ministry of Commerce of China. Only when the proportion of the value of rare earth substances originating in China to the value of rare earth materials manufactured overseas reaches 0.1% and above does a license from the Ministry of Commerce of China become necessary. According to rare earth industry experts, this threshold essentially brings all strategically valuable and regulatory-relevant rare earth materials from overseas within the scope of China’s export controls.

It’s worth noting that this value proportion setting method is basically consistent with the “U.S. Content Rule” in U.S. export control and economic sanctions regulations. Section 734.4 of the U.S. EAR provides that, for foreign-manufactured products exported to non-U.S.-sanctioned countries, if products incorporates 25% and above by value of the items originating in the U.S.; for foreign-manufactured products exported to U.S.-sanctioned countries (such as Iran, North Korea, and Russia), if products incorporates 10% and above by value of the items originating in the U.S, such products shall be deemed as controlled items under the EAR and subject to the EAR’s export licensing requirements. This provision is known as the “De minimis U.S. Content Rule” in U.S. export control regulations. The “China Content Rule” imposes no restrictions or distinctions on the export destination of foreign-manufactured rare earth items; the same value proportion requirement of 0.1% and above applies to all destination countries or regions.

(4) Regarding the “Chinese version of FDPR” and “rare earth technology”

Clause 2 of “Article 1” of Announcement No. 61 is about the situation where relevant rare earth technologies originating in China are used in the overseas manufacturing of relevant rare earth items (materials and/or substances). The item points out that these technologies include rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and rare earth secondary resource recycling and utilisation related technologies. As for the precise connotations of these “relevant technologies”, Announcement No. 62 (“ Decision on the Implementation of Export Control on Rare Earth-Related Technologies”) , which was published on the same day as Announcement No. 61, stipulates the precise connotations of these “relevant technologies”, which specifically include three aspects of technology: the first is “relevant technologies and their carriers for rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and rare earth secondary resource recycling and utilization (control code: 1E902.a)”; the second is “relevant production line assembly, commissioning, maintenance, repair, and upgrading technologies for rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and rare earth secondary resource recycling and utilization (control code: 1E902.b)”; the third is non-export controlled technologies, but if the exporting operators are aware that the technology is used for or substantially contributes to foreign rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and rare earth secondary resource recycling and utilization activities, they must also apply to the Ministry of Commerce for an export license for dual-use items before exporting.

Announcement No. 61 and Announcement No. 62 clearly define the manufacturing process of rare earth technologies in the same way: “rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and rare earth secondary resource recycling and utilization”, effectively encompassing the “entire process.” Announcement No. 62 further clarifies that the “technologies” in Article 1, Clause 2 of Announcement No. 61 includes “relevant technologies and their carriers”, “relevant production line technologies”, and “non-export controlled technologies, but if the exporting operators are aware that the technology is used for or substantially contributes to foreign rare earth mining, smelting and separation, metal smelting, magnetic material manufacturing, and rare earth secondary resource recycling and utilization activities”. As for “technologies and their carriers”, it refers to technology-related materials and other data, such as design drawings, process specifications, process parameters, machining programs, simulation data, etc. Furthermore, the third technology category mentioned above is formulated in accordance with Article 12 of the Export Control Law and Article 14 of the Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items. For example, Article 12 of the Export Control Law clearly stipulates that for goods, technologies and services other than the controlled or temporarily controlled items listed in the export control list, if the export operator knows or should have known, or is notified by the national export control management department, that the relevant goods, technologies and services may have relevant control risks, the export operator shall apply for a license from the national export control management department.

The control rule for rare earth technology in Article 1, Clause 2 of Announcement No. 61 bears some similarities to the Foreign-Direct Product Rules (FDPR) in Section 734.9 of the US EAR, making it a “Chinese version of the FDPR”. The FDPR in the US EAR stipulates that if an item manufactured outside the US is a direct product of, or manufactured with equipment that relies on, US-origin technology or software identified on the US Commerce Control List (CCL), then the foreign operator of that item will be subject to the EAR. Furthermore, the EAR also requires foreign operators of military, aerospace, and other highly sensitive technology-related items to apply for a license under the EAR if the item’s design, manufacture, or testing utilizes US-origin technology or software identified on the CCL. It is evident that the scope of application of Clause 2 of “Article 1” of Announcement No. 61 is wider than the FDPR of the US EAR, because it also includes the above-mentioned situations in which items are manufactured overseas using relevant US-origin technology or software in highly sensitive fields such as military and aerospace.

Articles 2, 3, 4 and 5 of Announcement No. 61 define the handling methods for three types of specific applications from the perspective of specific application types.

(1) In principle, licenses shall not be granted

Applications that shall not be granted in principle are divided into two specific situations:

1. Applications for export to specific users (including the “Chinese version of the 50%”)

Article 2 of Announcement No. 61 states that, in principle, applications for export to three types of users will not be approved. These three applications are: (1) export applications to foreign military users; (2) export applications to importers and end-users listed on the export control list; and (3) export applications to importers and end-users listed on the export control watch list.

It is important to note that this clause establishes a “Chinese version of the 50% rule”. That is, applications for export to the three types of specific users mentioned above include not only applications for export to these three types of entities themselves, but also applications for export to subsidiaries, branches, and other branches in which these three types of specific entities hold a 50% or higher stake.

The US export control system also has a “50% rule”. On September 29, 2025, after extensive internal research and discussion, the US Department of Commerce’s Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) issued the “Expansion of End-User Controls to Cover Affiliates of Certain Listed Entities”. This regulation stipulates that any subsidiary of a company listed on the Entity List or the Military End User List, and the company holds a 50% or higher stake, shall be subject to the same export control measures.

It can thus be seen that about ten days after the release of the US export control “50% rule” penetration rule, Article 2 of Announcement No. 61 of 2025 of the Ministry of Commerce of China established the “Chinese version of the 50% rule”. This can be regarded as the reciprocal legislative rules for domestic export control formulated by China’s export control authorities in response to the “50% rule” recently issued by the United States, in compliance with and utilizing the principle of reciprocity stipulated in Article 48 of China’s Export Control Law.

2. Application for export items used for specific end-uses

Article 3 of Announcement No. 61 clearly states that, in principle, export applications for items that are used or may be used for military or terrorist purposes will not be approved. Specifically, there are three main end-uses: (1) design, development, production or use of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; (2) terrorist purposes; and (3) military use or the enhancement of military potential.

It is worth noting that the term “may be used for” is used in Article 3, indicating that China’s export control authorities have a certain degree of discretion on this issue. Not only will they not approve applications for “use” that are already facts or can be proven, but also, for applications for “may be used for” that are only possible in the future, China’s export control authorities will not approve them in principle. This shows that China’s export control authorities have a cautious and responsible attitude towards applications for the export of rare earth items related to military or terrorist end uses.

(2) Case-by-case approval

Article 4 of Announcement No. 61 clearly stipulates that export applications for items used for the following three end-use types will be approved on a case-by-case basis:

1. For the research, development, and production of 14-nanometer and below logic chips or 256-layer and above memory chips;

2. For manufacturing the production equipment, testing equipment and materials of the above-mentioned processed semiconductors;

3. Export applications for the research and development of artificial intelligence with potential military applications.

As the China-US trade war intensifies, Article 4 of the Ministry of Commerce’s Announcement No. 61 addresses the US’s long-standing stranglehold on China’s core sectors, including semiconductors, artificial intelligence, and military industries. On August 12, the US added 32 Chinese companies in the semiconductor and other sectors to the Entity List for export control, severely disrupting the normal manufacturing and operations of these companies and numerous upstream and downstream related enterprises. On October 7, two days before the release of Announcement No. 61, the US House of Representatives released a report titled Selling the Forges of the Future, demanding a complete ban on the export of DUV lithography machines above 28nm to China, in an attempt to further curb the normal development of China’s semiconductor and other industries. Consequently, as the US tightens its stranglehold on China, China has been forced to retaliate in self-defence, leveraging rare earth elements, often referred to as “industrial MSG”, in which China has a significant global advantage, to establish reciprocal export control rules.

Of course, it’s important to note that the “case-by-case approval” system for export applications in the aforementioned sectors indicates that China’s export control authorities will not refuse approval in principle, but will instead decide whether and how to grant approval based on the specific circumstances of each application. This provides ample room for future China-US trade negotiations and embodies the fundamental philosophy and principle of reciprocity and restraint inherent in China’s export control and economic sanctions legal system: “We will not attack unless we are attacked; but if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack.”

(3) Post-event reporting and commitment

Article 5 of Announcement No. 61 explicitly stipulates that for export applications where the end use is humanitarian rescue, export operators do not need to apply for export licenses for dual-use items. However, they must report to the Ministry of Commerce of China no later than 10 working days after the export and undertake that the relevant items will not be used for purposes that endanger China’s national security and interests. Humanitarian rescue includes emergency medical treatment, response to public health emergencies, and natural disaster relief etc.

This shows that, provided China’s national security and interests are not compromised, the Chinese government will relax export controls on rare earth items for applications whose end use is for humanitarian rescue, such as emergency medical treatment, responding to public health emergencies, and natural disaster relief etc. Foreign export operators no longer need to apply for a license; they only need to report and make a commitment afterwards. This demonstrates the Chinese government’s proactive attitude in supporting international humanitarian efforts and shouldering the responsibilities of a major country.

(1) Traditional Jurisdiction: Principles of Nationality-Based and Territorial Jurisdiction

At this point, a question arises: what does the term “export” mean in Article 1 of Announcement No. 61, which states that “Overseas organizations and individuals shall obtain a dual-use items export license issued by the Ministry of Commerce of China prior to exporting to countries and regions other than China any of the following items”?

Article 2 of China’s 2020 Export Control Law stipulates: “For the purpose of the present law, the term ‘export control’ refers to prohibitive or restrictive measures taken by the State against the transfer of controlled items from the territory of the People's Republic of China to overseas, and the provision of controlled items by citizens, legal persons and other non-incorporated organizations of the People's Republic of China to foreign organizations and individuals.” This article clearly defines “export” as encompassing two categories: the first, “territorial transfer”, refers to the transfer of controlled items from within China to the countries or regions outside the territory of China. Regardless of the nationality of the transferor, which can be Chinese or foreign, China’s export control laws and regulations have jurisdiction over such transfers. The second, “entity change”, means that Chinese entities providing controlled items to foreign entities, regardless of where the provision occurs, whether within China or in other countries and regions outside China’s territory, fall under the jurisdiction of China's export control laws and regulations. From the perspective of international law, we can see that the jurisdiction of the first type of export is Territorial Jurisdiction, established based on territorial boundaries; the second type of jurisdiction is Nationality-based Jurisdiction. This “territory + nationality” principle of setting export control jurisdiction has been specifically confirmed in Article 2 of China’s 2024 Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items and Article 2 of the Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 62 of 2025.

(2) The principle of “Object-based Jurisdiction” under the “long-arm jurisdiction” framework

At this point, let’s revisit my earlier question: What exactly does the term “export” in Article 1 of Announcement No. 61 mean? On the one hand, it’s not based on “territorial jurisdiction”, because the export takes place outside China’s territory and doesn’t involve any territorial element of China. On the other hand, it’s not based on “nationality-based jurisdiction”, because the entity performing the transaction is a foreign entity and no Chinese citizens are involved. So, what kind of jurisdiction is this? “Object-based jurisdiction”!

The principle of “Object-based Jurisdiction” means that all relevant “items of Chinese origin”, including items originating from China, products that contain, integrate, or mix with items of Chinese origin, or products produced using technology of Chinese origin, remain subject to the jurisdiction of China’s export control legal system, regardless of the territory in which the items are located (territorial principle) or the nationality of the entities holding or manufacturing the items (nationality principle). In other words, the principle of “object-based jurisdiction” attaches jurisdiction to the item itself, rather than to the traditional bases of the nationality or the territory.

Accordingly, the term “export” in Article 1 of Announcement No. 61 should be interpreted to mean that, as long as rare earth items (whether substances or materials) originate from China, or rare earth materials that contain, integrate or mix with rare earth substances (where the proportion of rare earth substance reaches 0.1% or more ), or rare earth items produced or manufactured using rare earth technology of Chinese origin, such items will continue to be subject to the jurisdiction and binding force of China’s export control laws and regulations, regardless of the territory in which they are produced, manufactured, or located, or the nationality of the entities possessing them.

As mentioned above, Article 49 of China’s Regulations on Export Control of Dual-Use Items makes the first legislative provision establishing the principle of “object-based jurisdiction” under China’s “long-arm jurisdiction” framework for dual-use items. Article 1 of the Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 61 of 2025 represents the first explicit formulation of specific “object-based jurisdiction” rules within “long-arm jurisdiction” framework for rare earth export controls.

(3) The “Effects Doctrine/Protective Principle” under the “Long-Arm Jurisdiction” framework

Compared with the “object-based jurisdiction” principle under the “long-arm jurisdiction” framework, the other— and indeed the longest—arm of jurisdiction is the one based on the “effects doctrine/protective principle”. The United States is the country that applies these two doctrines most extensively under its “long-arm jurisdiction” regime. The basic logic of this jurisdictional principle is that even if a product does not involve any U.S. items (physical goods, technology, software, or equipment, etc.), is not held, manufactured, produced, transferred, or provided by U.S. entities, and the relevant activities occur entirely outside U.S. territory, the United States may still assert jurisdiction if it determines that the export of such as product is intended to evade U.S. export control rules or the result of such export has a substantial impact on U.S. national security or interests,. The legal foundation of this assertion rests on two principles: “The Effects Doctrine”, which provides that the United States may exercise jurisdiction when foreign conduct produces substantial effects on the United States; and, “The Protective Principle”, which allows jurisdiction when the purpose of assertion is to safeguard U.S. national security, foreign policy, or other vital national interests.

Objectively speaking, the “effects doctrine/protective principle” under the long-arm jurisdiction framework possesses a degree of legal and logical coherence. It is widely recognized, however, that a country’s ability to actually enforce this form of “longest-arm jurisdiction” on a global scale depends not only on the existence of  relevant legislative provisions, but also on its comprehensive national power at the enforcement level—such as world-leading military capabilities, financial and economic strength, and scientific and technological innovation—which together provide the foundation and capacity to enforce such jurisdiction when violations occur.

However, has China also established the “effects doctrine/protective principle” within its “long-arm jurisdiction” framework for export controls? In our view, the answer is yes—at least at the level of legal principle—through Article 44 of the Export Control Law, as mentioned above. This article provides that where any foreign entity endangers China’s national security and interests or hinders China’s fulfilment of its international obligations, including those relating to non-proliferation, China’s export control laws and regulations shall have jurisdiction over such conduct. Accordingly, although the Ministry of Commerce Announcement No. 61 of 2025 does not contain specific provisions on rare earth items that directly embody the “effects doctrine/protective principle” under the “long-arm jurisdiction” framework, from a legal standpoint this does not alter the fact that, if a foreign entity exports rare earth items in a manner that threatens China’s national security and interests, or interferes with its fulfillment of international obligations, such as non-proliferation, then—even if such exports fall outside China’s traditional “territory + nationality” jurisdiction or its object-based jurisdiction—the competent Chinese authorities remain entitled to invoke Article 44 of the Export Control Law to assert jurisdiction based on the “effects doctrine/protective principle.”

In summary, to facilitate understanding, the following chart illustrates the four types of jurisdiction that together constitute the structure of China’s export control legal framework: